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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the effects of civil society’s involvement in the Tunisian democratic 
transition through a case study on its contributions to the constitution drafting process.  Tunisia 
gained widespread international attention following its popular uprising against authoritarian 
leader Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and successful transition to democracy.  Many, however, have 
dismissed Tunisia’s triumph as a lucky break aided by the country’s small size, religious and 
ethnic homogeneity, pre-existing liberal social values, and “relatively moderate” Islamist party.  
Those focused on such “Tunisian exceptionalism” conclude that the country’s transition has little 
to teach other countries in political flux.   
 
This research contests that notion, and proposes that Tunisia’s transition has succeeded instead 
due to the presence of a strong and collaborative civil society, which grew discreetly throughout 
periods of authoritarianism and has matured in the post-revolution years.  This paper specifically 
analyzes the debate concerning women’s rights in the constitution as an example of state-civil 
society interaction during the transitional period.  The efforts of actors within Tunisia’s vibrant 
civil society – including activists, non-governmental organizations, unions, and the media – 
significantly changed the outcomes of political decision making in the transitional period.  
Examining the processes and outcomes of Tunisia’s transition allows not only for better insight 
into the vital role of civil society in Tunisian politics and culture, but also offers a new 
understanding of the potential influence of non-state institutions on the evolution of the state.  
This case study proposes several lessons that should be used to inform decision making in future 
projects of peacebuilding and political change in the Middle East and throughout the world.   
 
 
 
Keywords: civic engagement, civil society, constitutional drafting, democracy, democratization, 
governance, Middle East, Tunisia, peacebuilding, political change, revolutions, women’s rights 
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CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS IN TUNISIA1 
 
 Association of Ennahda Women Arrhma: Association des Femmes Nahdaouis 
  
◊ Association of Tunisian Judges Association des magistrats tunisiens  (AMT) 
 Association of Tunisian Women Nissa Tounsyat    
◊ Association of Tunisian Women for 
Research on Development 
Association des femmes tunisiennes pour 
la recherche sur le développement 
(AFTURD) 
 
Center for Research, Documentation 
and Information on Women  
Centre de recherches, d'études, de 
documentation et d'information sur la 
femme 
(CREDIF) 
 Health Workers’ Union  La fédération générale de la santé   
◊ International Association for Support 
of Political Prisoners 
Association internationale de soutien aux 
prisonniers politiques 
(AISPP) 
◊ Liberty and Justice Association Association liberté et justice   
◊ 
Modernization Movement of the 
Tunisian Union of Industry, Trades 
and Crafts 
Mouvement de modernisation de l'Union 
tunisienne de l'industrie, du commerce et 
de l'artisanat 
  
◊ National Council for Liberties in 
Tunisia 
Conseil national pour les libertés en 
Tunisie 
(CNLT) 
 National Council for the Protection of the Revolution 
Conseil national pour la protection de la 
révolution 
(CNPR) 
◊ National Order of Doctors Ordre national des médecin   
◊ National Order of Lawyers Ordre national des avocats (ONAT) 
◊ National Union of Specialist Doctors 
and Free Practice 
Syndicat national des médecins 
spécialistes de libre pratique 
  
◊ National Union of Tunisian Journalists  Syndicat national des journalistes 
tunisiens 
(SNJT) 
 National Union of Tunisian Women Union National de la Femme Tunisienne  (UNFT) 
◊ Organizations of Emigrants Les organisations d'émigrés   
 Postal Workers’ Union Les travailleurs de la Poste tunisienne   
                                                
1 List sourced in part from Alcinda Honwana, Youth and Revolution in Tunisia, xii-xiv; and Ellen Lust, 
The Middle East, 811-812. 
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 Primary School Teachers’ Union Syndicat National des Enseignements de l'école primaire 
  
 Secondary School Teachers' Union Syndicat National des Enseignements  (SNES) 
◊ Tunisian Association of Chambers of 
Notaries 
Association tunisienne des chambres de 
notaires 
  
◊ Tunisian Association of Democratic 
Women 
Association tunisienne des femmes 
démocrates 
(ATFD) 
◊ Tunisian General Labor Union Union générale tunisienne du travail (UGTT) 
◊ Tunisian League for the Defense of 
Human Rights 
Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des 
droits de l’Homme  
(LTDH) 
 Tunisian Union of Industry, Trades and Crafts 
Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du 
Commerce et de l’Artisanat  
(UTICA) 
 Union of Independent Tunisians for Freedom 
Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la 
Liberté 
(UTIL) 
 
 
 
◊: Member of the Higher Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political 
Reform, and Democratic Transition, the body of associations that “determined the direction of the 
constitutional process, the interim government, and its authorities.”2
                                                
2 Ellen Lust, The Middle East, 811. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Tunisia stunned the world in 2011 when it became the first Arab country to successfully 
rise up against repression and demand regime change, inspiring a series of region-wide protests 
known as the Arab Spring.  Tunisia’s movement, named the Jasmine Revolution, was powered 
by largely nonviolent means and called for reform and democratization.  In three years, 
Tunisians created a constitution hailed internationally for its progressive focus on human rights 
and civil liberties.  The document represented a genuine compromise overcoming the 
secular/religious divide that halted the progress of other transitioning countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa, such as Egypt.  Scholars and journalists alike have traced Tunisia’s 
achievements to a plethora of factors, from the lack of interference by the army to religious 
homogeneity.  A deeper analysis, however, finds the collective actions of civil society to be the 
single most influential factor in the course of Tunisia’s transition.  It is through their dynamic 
and diverse civil society that Tunisians have successfully expressed their collective will in the 
transitional period and advocated for their rights, in ways that have positively shaped their post-
revolution political institutions. 
A functioning civil society, comprised of the non-governmental organizations and 
institutions through which public engagement is channeled, is one of the fundamentals of a 
strong democracy.  For a state to maintain its democratic status and protect against despotism 
requires citizens to embrace civic values (the elements of civic culture that train citizens in 
activism, reason, and engagement) that help them shape their own political lives.3  The resultant 
civil society is a natural extension of these individual-held values, expressed collectively to 
achieve community goals.     
                                                
3 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, 7-30. 
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In the case of post-revolution Tunisia, a strong group of civil society actors – including 
but not limited to activists, unions, non-governmental organizations, media, and an educated and 
involved public – have been integral to the creation of a new system of laws defending civil 
liberties at levels unprecedented in most countries throughout the world.  It is by the efforts of a 
strong civil society in Tunisia that legitimate political institutions have formed, maintained the 
democratic nature of the transition, and sustained the liberal interpretation of human rights and 
freedoms that Tunisia has maintained since the nation’s independence.  This was internationally 
recognized in October 2015, when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded a coalition of 
Tunisian civil society organizations the Nobel Peace Prize for their integral role in the 
democratic transition. 
Despite the magnitude of Tunisian civil society’s achievements, the literature on its 
development is scarce.  This work aims to address this problem through an in-depth case study of 
Tunisian civil society using a basis in theory, history, and analysis of recent events.  Chapter 1 
surveys theories of civil society and its role in democratization, giving specific attention to 
scholars’ observations of and theoretical explanations for what they identify as a lack of civil 
society in the Middle East and North Africa.  Chapter 2 establishes a historical framework of 
civil society in Tunisia, tracing its development through the pre-colonial, colonial, and 
independence eras.  Chapter 3 provides a brief background on Tunisia’s revolution, key 
transitional institutions, and modes of civil society involvement in the constitution development 
process.  Chapter 4 examines the debate concerning the status of women in the constitution 
drafting process as a case study for the interaction of Tunisian civil society and the state, 
bringing light to key moments that demonstrate the collaborative, and sometimes 
confrontational, relationship between the two.  Finally, Chapter 5 highlights central lessons of 
 9 
the Tunisian case, and proposes ways in which these lessons can be applied to future 
democratization projects in other countries to increase odds of success. 
This research primarily relied upon analysis of books and journal articles to establish a 
theoretical and historical background of the subject.  News articles were essential to the case 
study of Tunisia’s constitution drafting process and the debate over the status of women, given 
the recent nature of events.  Publications and reports by international non-governmental 
organizations provided deeper academic and policy-oriented analysis of recent events.  In 
addition, the author’s periods of study, travel, and research in Tunisia, spanning from September 
2012 to March 2015, provided essential context to this project. 
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CHAPTER 1: Civil Society and its Role in Democratization 
 
 Tunisia’s successful political transition came about through the deep and consistent 
involvement of civil society – from the moment the uprising began, through the constitution 
drafting process, and into its current era of newly democratic statehood.  The diverse array of 
actors that make up Tunisian civil society did not appear overnight; rather, they developed over 
centuries to serve civic functions.  Historically, scholars have held that the Middle East is devoid 
of civil society due to Arab and/or Islamic culture, and thus unlikely to democratize.4  However, 
the readiness of the Tunisian activists, unions, non-governmental organizations, and media to fill 
the roles of civil society in the transitional period calls this assumption into question.    
 
Civil society 
The term civil society has many interpretations.  Broadly, it is the sum of actors that 
contribute to civic engagement.  The concept of civil society has deep roots in Western 
philosophy and politics, emerging from the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers dating 
back to the 5th century BCE.  Aristotle, in Politics, describes a “political community” (koinōnia 
politikē) separate from the state, characterized by a set of norms and through which man worked 
toward a common wellbeing.  This concept, translated by the Romans as societas civilis, formed 
the basis for the modern concept of civil society, which scholars and policymakers have 
increasingly identified as a critical counterbalance to government power and a vehicle for citizen 
voice.  
It is important to note that the philosophical roots of civil society go back not only to the 
origins of Western political thought, but also to those of the Middle East.  The concept of civil 
                                                
4 Bernard Lewis, "The roots of Muslim rage"; Sean L. Yom, "Civil society and democratization in the 
Arab world," 15. 
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society (al-mujtama’ al-madani) exists within Arab discourse and is central to current political 
debates.5  Citizens in the Middle East, increasingly involved in politics, often frame their 
engagement through the debate over civil society’s boundaries.6 
 
What constitutes modern civil society? 
In modern academic and political discourse, the term ‘civil society’ is often simplified to 
mean the aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions, without giving 
significant consideration to the way other sectors can contribute to civic goals.  Approaching the 
measurement of civil society this way is easily quantifiable, which can explain why so many 
scholars and organizations have done so.  The World Bank, for example, has adopted the 
following definition of civil society “developed by leading research centers”: 
 
The term civil society is to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit 
organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of 
their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or 
philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a 
wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations, and foundations.7 
 
 
 The strength of civil society is difficult to gauge.  A variety of institutions not normally 
considered CSOs can play overlapping and important roles and serve civic functions in both 
overt and non-obvious ways.  The depth of people’s support for their civil society organizations 
is also hard to measure, but essential to the tenuous work of democratization. 
The main weakness of measuring civil society purely by counting the number of 
organizations present is that it fails to take into account the full stratum of actors that form a 
                                                
5 Eva Bellin, “Civil Society in Formation: Tunisia,” 121. 
6 Eva Bellin, “Civil Society: Effective Tool of Analysis for Middle East Politics?” 510. 
7 The World Bank, “Defining civil society.” 
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strong civil society in a given society. Using such a definition, some may characterize a society 
that lacks a particularly strong NGO sector as lacking a civil society.  However, this line of 
reasoning does not take into consideration the possibility that other groups within society not 
typically thought of as CSOs may have taken on the duties of civil society in a way that 
circumvents an oppressive regime. 
Alternatively, relying upon organization counts to measure civil society can overstate the 
presence of civil society.  A state in which there are a plethora of associations may appear to 
have a strong civil society upon first glance; however, if such bodies fail to act as true vehicles 
for civic empowerment and act in the interest of the people, such a characterization may be false.  
This distinction is key when evaluating the presence and strength of civil society.  From the 
outside, a community with a strong associational sector and a community with a strong civil 
society may appear very similar.  This has been especially true in the Middle East, where 
scholars have identified some countries as having a strong civil society simply by counting the 
number of associations per capita, while failing to realize that many of those groups pursue 
uncivil aims, and therefore should not be considered elements of civil society.   
CIVICUS, known as the “global civil society alliance,” proposes a useful yet incomplete 
definition that includes typical CSOs as well as individual activists (including online activists, 
artists, writers, and human rights defenders) when they act in the public sphere to advance or 
defend a viewpoint that others may share.8  This definition is more well rounded than those that 
simply emphasize the importance of the NGO sector, but it still fails to encompass the true 
breadth of civil society.   
                                                
8 CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation, “State of Civil Society 2013: Creating an enabling 
environment,” 10. 
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Civil society is more than the groups and individuals themselves: it is the sum of all 
collective civic action aimed at accomplishing community goals.  It is comprised of a wide array 
of actors, including the media, unions, professional associations, nongovernmental organizations, 
and activist or interest groups that seek to influence politics for civic purposes.  However, 
significantly, its strength is determined by the depth to which civic engagement permeates public 
life. Civil society must be measured by an assessment of the degree to which the concepts of 
civic activism and engagement have been internalized by a society and expressed in its actions, 
in addition to the traditional barometers of non-governmental organization and association 
counts. 
 
The role of civil society in democratization 
Civil society is widely understood to offer the social underpinnings for democratic forms 
of government.9  It “advances democracy in two generic ways: by helping to generate a transition 
from authoritarian rule to (at least) electoral democracy,” and by “deepening and consolidating 
democracy once it is established.”10  Alexis de Tocqueville, writing during his travels in the 
United States in the early 19th century, was among the first to describe the relationship between 
civil society and democratic culture. De Tocqueville noted that Americans had a strong 
propensity for organizing private associations, which he believed were “schools for democracy” 
for their ability to teach private individuals the skills of coming together for public purposes.11  
He argued that this network of organizations would foster civic values and prevent tyranny – 
functions essential to the survival of a new democratic state. 
                                                
9 Clement Moore Henry, “Post-Colonial Dialectics of Civil Society,” 11, in Yahia H. Zoubir, North Africa 
in Transition: State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s. 
10 Larry Diamond, “Civil Society and the Development of Democracy,” 25. 
11 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, 482. 
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Civil society is critical to the development of not just democracy, but especially liberal 
democracy. Liberalism, the tradition that seeks to protect an individual’s natural and political 
rights, has become an inseparable part of the concept of democracy in the Western world.  An 
illiberal democracy is one that fails to protect the rights of its citizens despite being chosen by 
them.12  Civil society is a key force pushing the state towards liberalism by supporting public 
interests and holding political actors accountable. 
Theories connecting the concepts of civil society and democracy were furthered 
significantly in the 20th century, when the former was resurrected by political scientists during 
the Cold War in an effort to describe political changes occurring at the time.13  Soon after, 
theorists including Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba further developed the connection between 
civil society and democracy through their argument that civic culture was essential to a 
democratic order.14  Political sociologist and democratization expert Larry Diamond furthered 
the discussion of the relationship between political elites and the public by arguing that while 
political elites are indispensable to bringing about democracy and making it work,15 they cannot 
act alone.  “Democracy, and especially liberal democracy,” he writes, “requires multiple avenues 
for ‘the people’ to express their interests and preferences, to influence policy, and to scrutinize 
and check the exercise of state power.”16 
Active civil societies are integral to the production and maintenance of strong political 
institutions, which are a key element of democratic transitions.  These institutions – including 
rule-abiding political parties, an inclusive and participatory legislature, and a clear and fair legal 
system – can prevent conflict, address fragility, rebuild trust, and reconnect the citizen-state-
                                                
12 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” 
13 Eva Bellin, “Civil Society in Formation: Tunisia,” 120. 
14 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, 7-30. 
15 Larry Diamond, “Civil Society and the Development of Democracy,” 1. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
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society relationship in a transitional period, supporting political settlements and reducing the 
potential for renewed conflict.17  Such institutions serve to prevent the tyranny of the majority18 
that can exist even with a strong civil society by fostering civility, legally mandating tolerance 
and adherence to the rules of the game,19 while also defending civil liberties (the guarantee of the 
individual’s most basic freedoms) regardless of political persuasion.20   
The ability of civil society to positively contribute to a democratic system depends upon 
the depth and reach of civic values and community engagement in that society.  Political scientist 
Robert Putnam’s seminal 2000 text, Bowling Alone, shifted the civil society debate by arguing 
that it extends far beyond explicitly political and civic organizations, and into all dimensions of 
human interaction that contribute to an individual’s sense of community.  Echoing de 
Tocqueville, Putnam sees voluntary associations as an opportunity for members to gain social 
capital and civic skills – making them “schools for democracy.”21  This concept is critically 
important to understanding the breadth and depth of civil society in 21st century Tunisia, where 
associations of all kinds have become training grounds for community engagement (even during 
periods of repression) and have fostered civic activism in the transitional period.  
The social capital gained from community involvement reinforces legitimacy, deepens 
the level of trust within a society, strengthens shared values, and builds the networks that hold 
society together. Thus, the strength of democratic institutions is heavily reliant upon social 
capital.22  In communities in which social capital is high, individuals are more likely to 
                                                
17 United Nations Development Programme, “Inclusive and Participative Political Institutions in Select 
Arab States, 2012-2013,” 2.  
18 John Adams, “A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,” 291; 
see also James Madison, "The federalist no. 10." 
19 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society,” 3-20. 
20 Eva R. Bellin, “Civil Society in Formation: Tunisia,” 122. 
21 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, 338. 
22 Ibid., 349. 
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participate in public goods, such as contributions to public broadcasting, and less likely to 
circumvent the system – for example, evading taxes.23 A decrease in associational activity, and 
the resulting decrease in social capital, weakens a democratic society.24  
Civil society also has a positive influence on the strength, transparency, and functionality 
of political institutions.  Francis Fukuyama’s 2014 Political Order and Political Decay, which 
examines the relationship between social conditions and liberal democracies, makes a strong 
case for the necessity of civil society in a liberal democratic state.  Fukuyama considers a few 
cultural conditions necessary to a stable, well-functioning liberal democracy: “politicians and 
voters cannot have a winner-take-all attitude towards their opponents, they must respect rules 
more than individuals, and they must share a collective sense of identity and nationhood.”25  
Fukuyama also describes the interaction of political and civic institutions as essential for the 
creation and maintenance of a stable, functional liberal democracy: “not just elections for a 
president or legislature but also well-organized political parties, an independent court system, an 
effective state bureaucracy, and a free and vigilant media.”26 
 Fukuyama observes that the overthrow of authoritarian power without the proper 
framework of civil society and stable, transparent institutions fails to bring about liberal 
democracy.  The architects of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, expected that 
democracy would appear “spontaneously” upon the removal of Saddam Hussein.27  However, 
both the Bush and Obama administrations have spent more than a decade attempting to oversee 
the creation of democratic institutions largely absent before the invasion and without which Iraqi 
                                                
23 Ibid., 347-348. 
24 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, 482 
25 Ibid., 428 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 429. 
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democracy cannot come about.28  The Iraqi experience illuminates the necessity of civil society 
in countries undergoing political transitions and the devastation that can occur when a state is 
transformed without a civil society to help it take root. 
Those who question the thesis that civil society can bring about democratic change 
sometimes dispute the presumption that the collective force of civil society can compel 
authoritarian governments to instigate periods of democratization.29 Indeed, the effectiveness of 
civil society initiatives for democratic change under authoritarian leadership is unclear.  Civil 
society initiatives sometimes result in reactionary policies that lead to the deeper entrenchment 
of undemocratic behavior by authoritarian leaders.  In periods of transition, however, civil 
society has a unique opening for effective action.   
While the scholarly literature tends to overemphasize the primary role of elites in leading, 
crafting, negotiating (or imposing) democratic transitions, Diamond stresses the importance of 
the role of “the public…organized and mobilized through civil society” – in many prominent 
cases of democratization.  The widespread mobilization of the public was specifically witnessed 
in democratic transitions of the “Third Wave,”30 a phrase coined by Samuel Huntington in 1989 
describing the surge of democracy that spread to Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Eastern 
Europe in 1970s and 80s.31  In many cases, civil society has played a crucial role, if not the 
leading role, in producing a transition to democracy32 through such methods as election 
monitoring,33 petitions,34 and demonstrations35 that contribute to a “popular upsurge”36 and keep 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 Sean L. Yom, “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World,” 14-15. 
30 Larry Diamond, “Civil Society and the Development of Democracy,” 25. 
31 Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave. 
32 Larry Diamond, “Civil Society and the Development of Democracy,” 28. 
33 Ibid., 29. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 32. 
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the revolution on course towards liberal aims.  The collaborative efforts of civil society – 
“students, [religious groups], professional associations, women’s groups, trade unions, human 
rights organizations, producer groups, intellectuals, journalists, civic associations, and informal 
networks” – create opportunities for civil society to negotiate during challenges that arise during 
the transition.37 
 Civil society has a specific opening to influence positive change in national dialogues 
that result in the drafting of a peace agreement or constitution.  Analysis of case studies of peace 
agreements over the last fifteen years finds that “high or moderate civil society involvement in 
peace negotiations appears to be strongly correlated with sustained peace in the peace-building 
phase.”38  Although authorities may be hesitant to include civil society in peace negotiations for 
worry of having too many voices at the table, “the absence of these voices and interests… can 
prove fatal” to the agreement in the post-conflict phase.39  Participatory constitution-making can 
“confront deep-seated regional, ethnic, or religious issues in a way that top-down, elite-driven 
constitutional reform may not,”40 by building trust among communities; creating new 
institutional arrangements, rights, or guarantees; empowering previously marginalized peoples; 
and providing an opportunity for the nation to “forge a common vision on the identity and core 
values of the nation.”41 
 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Jason Gluck and Michele Brandt, “Participatory and Inclusive Constitution Making,” 11. 
39 Ibid., 12. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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Civil society and democracy in the Middle East 
Theorists articulating the concept of civil society in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries often subscribed to orientalist ideas.  Montesquieu, Hegel, de Tocqueville, and Mill 
contrasted their dynamic civil societies with “static” Oriental or Islamist ones.42 Arguments have 
been made against the potential of Middle Eastern countries to democratize, citing the region’s 
relative lack of change during the Third Wave. Many consider either Islam or Arab culture 
responsible for the region’s lack of liberal democracy.43  Because of this, many of the normative 
assertions of theorists studying civil society excluded Arab and Islamic societies from those 
considered capable of having a significant civil society. 
Before the Arab Spring, some scholars disputed the thesis that civil society can instigate 
democratic change in repressed societies in the Arab world, instead arguing that civil society as it 
exists in the Middle East serves only as a tool for use by authoritarian leaders to further 
strategize control over their populaces.44   However, such a view failed to take into consideration 
the full spectrum of “civil society.”  The expansion of associations under the Ben Ali regime in 
Tunisia, the Mubarak regime in Egypt, and others did indeed often serve as a function of these 
rulers’ strategized control.  However, a more nuanced definition of civil society includes the 
civic values, knowledge of democratic processes, and desires of the people that are conducive to 
democratic governance.  Because some scholars of the Middle East and North Africa have 
equated civil society to associational life, while others have expanded civil society’s definition to 
include the sociological and psychological roots of civic culture, there is not a clear consensus in 
the literature as to whether any particular state in the Arab world had a strong or weak civil 
society under their authoritarian regimes, nor a consensus on the strength of their civil societies 
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today. Adopting the second definition, which includes the scope of civic culture in measuring a 
country’s civil society, finds that Tunisia had a diverse and active civil society that was 
restrained in its abilities to act under periods of dictatorship, and has begun to thrive in a new era 
of freedom. 
Measuring civil society in the Middle East requires a broader, more dynamic lens of 
analysis due to the region’s unique history of authoritarianism and repression.  Though civil 
societies in the Middle East may not appear in the same way they do in more liberal countries, 
that does not mean civil society does not exist.  This idea is articulated by political sociologist 
Asef Bayat, who asserts that there is no separation between everyday public life and the 
collective actions of civil society.  He describes “nonmovements” as crucial and under-
recognized phenomena of civic activism: 
 
[U]nlike social movements, where actors are involved usually in extraordinary deeds of 
mobilization and protestation that go beyond the routine of daily life (e.g., attending 
meetings, petitioning, lobbying, demonstrating, and so on), the nonmovements are made 
up of practices that are merged into, indeed are part and parcel of, the ordinary practices 
of everyday life. Thus, the poor people building homes, getting piped water or phone 
lines, or spreading their merchandise out in the urban sidewalks; the international 
migrants crossing borders to find new livelihoods; the women striving to go to college, 
playing sports, working in public, conducting “men’s work,” or choosing their own 
marriage partners; and the young appearing how they like, listening to what they wish, 
and hanging out where they prefer— all represent some core practices of nonmovements 
in the Middle East and similar world areas…The power of nonmovements rests on the 
power of big numbers, that is, the consequential effect on norms and rules in society of 
many people simultaneously doing similar, though contentious, things.45 
 
 
Even under dictatorship, Bayat explains, civil society has been an effective force in the 
region: “Surveys on civil society in the Middle East suggest that, despite the authoritarian nature 
of many states, human rights activists, artists, writers, religious figures, and professional groups 
                                                
45 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics, 20. 
 21 
have brought pressure to bear on the governments for accountability and openness.”46  Though 
they have not succeeded in overthrowing their country’s leadership, people are gradually 
opening their societies and challenging the boundaries of public life in the Middle East. 
The Arab uprisings of 2011 significantly disrupted static assumptions about the 
entrenchment of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, causing scholars to 
reconsider the potential of Arab states to democratize.  Fukuyama believes that these events put 
to end simple arguments that that the Arab world was exceptional and would passively accept 
dictatorship.47  While the hesitation to believe in Arab countries’ ability to democratize persists, 
the perception that Arab authoritarian leaders are immovable has diminished, and the academic 
and policy communities have started to realize that Arab states are now in a rapidly evolving 
period of social and political change. 
Attempts have been made to compare the Arab Uprisings of 2011 to the Third Wave 
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe.  Fukuyama explains that the fundamental difference 
that makes these comparisons futile is that most of the countries Latin America and Eastern 
Europe already had some experience with democracy.  He contextualizes the periods of 
dictatorship these countries experienced in the mid-20th century as “interruptions” in the 
historical path of these regions, with the return to democracy a “restoration of an older political 
order.”48 Fukuyama proposes that critics of the chaotic results of the 2011 Arab uprisings should 
consider the long and violent nature of the democratization of Europe, on the basis of medieval 
Europe and the modern Middle East’s shared lack of experience with democracy.49 
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Assessing the potential for democratization in Tunisia 
Scholarly analysis described Tunisia’s outlook for democracy in the two decades 
preceding the Arab Spring as mixed. Tunisia possessed the social conditions conducive to the 
development of a vibrant civil society: an educated middle class, a lack of religious or ethnic 
fragmentation, a lively private sector, and a plethora of associations fostering civic values, 
among others.50  However, Ben Ali’s hold seemed unbreakable, and his policies made the 
landscape of civil society organizations in Tunisia “ineffective, controlled, and dysfunctional.”51  
Given the widespread belief that the Middle East was lacking in civil society and democratic 
experience, it is not surprising that most concluded that Tunisia did not have a significant chance 
of democratizing. 52  Others were more optimistic, looking to Tunisia’s aforementioned qualities 
and giving it greater prospects for democracy than any other country in the region.53 
Although Tunisia has not historically been a democracy, it does have a long history of 
civic engagement in the public sphere via unions, associations, and a tradition of protest 
movements and other forms of political activism (described in Chapter 2). The success of civil 
society in shaping post-revolution Tunisia contradicts scholars’ claims that civil society is not the 
answer to “stubborn authoritarianism in the Middle East.”54  Tunisia has long possessed the 
foundations of democracy – namely, strong civil society and widespread civic values – that have 
made its recent political transition successful.  By stating that the Arab world has “no prior 
experience of democracy,” scholars such as Fukuyama completely overlook the existence of 
democratic roots and experiences in Tunisia throughout the nation’s history.   
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Conclusion 
Civil society is an essential component of democracy.  It serves the critical roles of 
holding political institutions accountable, preventing the tyranny of the majority, and providing a 
vehicle for citizen political participation.  Despite its important functions, civil society is 
sometimes hard to identify.  A society may have a large number of associations, but a weak civil 
society.  Alternately, it may have a strong civil society – that is, a wide array of actors that act as 
positive agents of change and advocate for civic values – but these actors may take different 
forms than the organizations and formal associations typically included in measurements of civil 
society.   
The inclusion of a wide range of civil society actors (including the public at large) in 
participatory, inclusive, and transparent processes can “transform the relationship between 
citizens and their government, particularly in countries emerging from totalitarian or 
authoritarian regimes.”  Specifically, the “constitutional moment” can help to construct a new 
national identity that rejects repression and violence and embraces a new era of democratic 
governance.55  The next chapter will explore the historical evolution of Tunisia’s civil society, 
illuminating ways in which it has formed in both traditional and atypical ways, to serve civic 
functions and force political change. 
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CHAPTER 2: The History of Civil Society in Tunisia 
 
Civil society in the Arab world has been both developed and impeded by a history rife 
with imperialism and authoritarianism.  The development of civil society in Tunisia can best be 
seen as a layering of different influences, spanning centuries.  These influences fostered the 
growth of the public sphere while at the same time challenging it, forcing Tunisian society to act 
in solidarity and evolve to fit changing circumstances.   
Throughout Tunisian history, associations, nongovernmental organizations, the media, 
and norms of public engagement have expanded.  Though constrained – first by the French, then 
former president Habib Bourguiba’s restrictive policies, and finally his successor Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali’s brutal repression – Tunisian civil society has found creative ways to not only 
survive, but press for change through activism and social movements.  Though civil society in 
Tunisia has become dramatically more open and visible in the years following Ben Ali’s 
departure, it is important to recognize that the uprising was “preceded by years of more tedious 
activism, rendering the revolution’s timeline much broader.”56  It is through generations of 
activism and civic engagement that Tunisian civil society developed the experience to support 
the country in the 2011 uprising and subsequent democratic transition. 
 
Early Tunisia (antiquity – 1881) 
Tunisia’s pre-colonial history – from its native roots in Berber heritage to its rule by the 
Ottoman Empire – represents centuries of influences, governments, and social systems.  Contrary 
to the beliefs of many Western scholars, this time period was not without civil society, but rather 
comprised the beginning of it.  While sometimes these early examples of civil society differ from 
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a Eurocentric model of civil society development, they nevertheless contributed to social capital 
and traditions of self-determinate governance that would provide the foundation for more formal 
civil society in the future. 
Conquered by a number of empires, but always retaining a significant degree of 
autonomy, early Tunisia was exposed to the influence of many different political systems. 
Carthage (located in modern-day Tunis) served as the capital city, spanning thirteen centuries 
under the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, and the Byzantines.  From 
time to time, however, the Berber population asserted their independence and succeeded in 
forming short-lived kingdoms, such as those of Massinissa, Jugurtha, and Juba.57  These systems 
of non-centralized governance developed early on the sort of community decision making 
foundational to democratic governance.  
Under the Ottoman Empire, the region known as Ifriqiya was divided into three ojaks, or 
“regencies,” – Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, more or less forming the modern borders of these 
states.58  The decentralized structure of the Ottoman Empire allowed the North African states 
greater autonomy than many other colonial territories of the time.  This lax form of governance 
kept local systems of government intact in a way that supported civil and political life despite 
colonial rule. Among the states under Ottoman rule, Tunisia stood out as particularly 
progressive.  For instance, from a legislative perspective, Tunisia was the first state in the region 
to adopt a bill of rights (1857) and a constitution (1861)59 and the first Muslim state to abolish 
slavery.60  Paralleling Tunisia’s early political development, the first clear examples of civil 
society in Tunisia can be traced to those that addressed immediate community needs: water 
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associations, philanthropic groups, and the waqaf, or charitable foundations.  Common 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, these extensive networks constitute major examples of the 
“autonomous working” of civil society and the public sphere in this era.61  
 
Colonial period (1881-1956)  
French colonialism was a complicating factor in the development of civil society in 
Tunisia.  It impeded civil society’s development, via institutions of colonial rule that attempted 
to squelch the civil societies and public sphere that already existed.  At the same time, the 
colonial experience resulted in an expansion of civic thought, via the importation of liberal 
French values, and increase in political activism, through movements against occupation. 
Prior to the arrival of the French, Tunisia had a developed structure of associations and 
political bodies fully capable of governance.  Chambers and Cummings (2004) articulate this 
dynamic: 
 
When Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881 it already had a centralised political 
structure with a developed administrative apparatus, borders which were largely accepted 
by its relatively homogenous population and strong interactions between the political 
centre in Tunis and rural groups, based on a long history of external trade.62  
 
 
The French administrative structure kept many Tunisian institutions intact.  The Bey, the 
prime minister, and his advisers remained in place, and the Tunisian system of caids, khalifas, 
and shaikhs was retained in local government.  However, effective power rested with the 
resident-general, the commander of the French forces, the French director-general of finance, 
and the controleurs civils (civilian controllers).  Tunisian courts were recognized and their codes 
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modernized, though French courts tried Europeans. An institution known as the Grand Conseil, 
formed of Tunisian and French sections, both elected, was given budgetary responsibilities. The 
French did not destroy Tunisian systems of governance, choosing instead to preserve them or 
include Tunisians in new ones,63 preserving Tunisia’s political identity in a way that allowed it to 
carry through to the post-colonial era.  This contrasts starkly with Algeria, where the French 
directly annexed the country and put strict French administrative structures in place, leaving it 
less ready to govern post-independence. 
Trade unions in Tunisia, first established in the early 20th century, played critical roles as 
political bodies and early civil society organizations.  Mohamed Ali al-Hammi founded the 
General Federation of Tunisian Workers in 1924, but it was from Farhat Hached in 1946 that the 
country gained what would become the single most powerful non-state institution in Tunisian 
history: the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT).  Hached learned union activism and 
organizing as a member of the French General Confederation of Labor (CGT) for 15 years 
before splitting from it to create the UGTT,64 demonstrating the direct influence of the French 
colonial experience on the growth of Tunisian civil society in that time.  The UGTT quickly 
gained support, clout, and international ties, which it used to pressure the French for more social 
and political rights for Tunisians.65   
During Tunisia’s period as a protectorate, the French worked to create a modern and 
loyal elite of civil character.  In 1896, the French approved a charter for the promotion of civil 
and sophisticated discussion.  This initiative resulted in the creation of the Khaldun Society (Al-
Jam'iyah Khalduniya, named after famous Tunisian philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun), 
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which served as a cultural society that aimed to link modernity with “rootedness” (asalah).  The 
Society provided free courses on European topics and provided a forum for intellectual and 
philosophical debate among Tunisians.  This institutionalized the French exportation of political 
and social theory to Tunisia, and contributed to the increasing French culture of the Tunisian 
elite.66  
Within a decade, the Khalduniya attracted some 150 people at its lectures and counted 
nearly 5000 readers in its library.  The Khalduniya was followed in December 1905 by the 
establishment of a further association, the Sadikiya. The Sadikiya, as well as forming a “meeting 
ground” for reformers, gave itself the task of popular education and followed various French 
examples (including that of French Roman Catholic activist Max Sangnier and his movement, 
the Sillon) in organizing lectures and seminars.67  Both organizations provided civic education 
and forums of debate critical to the evolution of civic thought among Tunisian elite in that 
period. 
Civil resistance against the French, from the end of World War II to 1956, existed 
through illegal informal networks and formal associations that the authorities periodically 
suppressed.68 This was known as the pays reel (the illegal informal networks and formal 
associations), in opposition to the pays legal (the associations within the public sphere allowed 
by the French Protectorate). The concept of a pays reel conveys a broader understanding of civil 
society than may typically be recognized in analysis of Tunisia. 69 
Tunisia’s tradition of cultural critique – expressed through public meetings, associations, 
and protest movements – “dates back at least to the decolonial struggle against French 
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colonialism in the 1930s and 1940s.”70  Tunisian scholar Nouri Gana (2013) notes evidence of 
“cultural and critical economic capital” in the formation of the intellectual Against the Wall 
Group (jama’ ittahta al-sur), “which brought together a heterogeneous collection of intellectuals 
and helped raise awareness about the colonial condition through regular meetings and debates 
organized in popular cafés.”  He also notes the significance of “Tunisia’s foremost national poet, 
Abul-Qasim al-Shabbi, and Tunisia’s foremost national playwright, Mahmoud al-Messadi,” who 
both wrote about freedom, “political paralysis,” and “defiance of French colonialism.”  Al-
Shabbi’s poetry was used by early protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, signifying “an evocation of 
the inextricable relationship between foreign and indigenous forms of oppression, and the need 
to fight both.”71  
Tunisia’s protracted anti-colonial struggle (in comparison with Morocco, which had a 
shorter period of struggle) provided an incubation period for the development of strong 
nationalist organizations and civil society.72 In the colonial period, Tunisian civil society evolved 
to both support community needs and challenge the power of the French. The expansion of 
unions, non-governmental organizations, academia, public education, and the media, and the 
development of a nationalist independence movement against the French, reveal the growth of 
civil society during colonial occupation. 
Led by future president of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba and assisted by the powerful UGTT 
labor union, the expulsion of the French culminating in the revolution of 1956 was a unifying 
and defining period for Tunisian society.  The collaborative actions of the labor unions, human 
rights advocates, and other community groups instilled in Tunisians a recognition of civil society 
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as a check on the power of the state.  The groups that fought against French occupation would 
continue to exist in Tunisia and form the basis of an active, involved civil society. 
 
Bourguiba period (1956-1987)  
Tunisia’s era under Bourguiba witnessed the continued role of civil society, though 
limited in power by an undemocratic regime.  Bourguiba saw civil society as a threat, and 
focused efforts towards weakening it.  According to Middle East scholar Clement Moore Henry, 
the period of Tunisian nation-building following independence involved a dialectical process 
progressing through three stages corresponding to three paradigmatic elite responses to the 
colonial situation.  First, the Tunisian elite sought to assimilate perceived “Western” values, 
including liberal constitutionalism and nationalism; second, they rejected them in the name of 
Islam and national authenticity; and third, they appropriated those values fully for purposes of 
national emancipation.73   
In 1956, immediately after Bourguiba came to power, he enacted the Personal Status 
Code (CSP), a legal document recognizing the equality of men and women.  The CSP abolished 
polygamy, mandated consent by both spouses prior to marriage, set a minimum age for marriage, 
and gave women legal divorce and inheritance rights.  The Personal Status Code became a 
symbol of Tunisia’s progressive, modern stance on women’s rights, and a stern dismissal of 
Islamists who maintained that men and women are not equal.  Following the promulgation of the 
CSP, Bourguiba also gave women the right to vote and run for office (1957); introduced wage 
equality, mandatory education, and access to contraception (1960s); and legalized abortion 
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(1970s).74  The CSP became a symbol for women’s rights in Tunisia, and future social 
movements in favor of women’s rights were commonly framed as movements defending the 
CSP.   
The UGTT only grew in power in the postcolonial period, and has played a large role in 
resistance efforts ever since.  It was one of the very few organizations allowed under Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali with significant power.75 The UGTT counts more than half a million dues-paying 
members, about five percent of Tunisia’s total population.76  It has been called “Tunisia’s largest 
civil society organization.”77  By fighting for laborers’ rights, the UGTT provided an early 
example of the kind of resistance against the regime that would reach its height in the Jasmine 
Revolution.  
The Bourguiba period also saw an enormous reform of the public education system, 
which included components of civic education.  The first reform (1958) sought to universalize 
access to education for all Tunisian children, starting at age six.78  The second reform (1989) 
engendered the creation of the cityoen moderne, or “modern citizen,” through the teaching of 
civic values.79  Tunisian psychiatrist Fatma Boubet de la Maisonneuve notes, “The men and 
women marching for democracy [in 2011] were all the children and grandchildren of women 
who had grown up with an education and a sense of their rights.”80 
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Ben Ali period (1987-2011) 
Following the coup that ousted President Bourguiba and brought former Prime Minister 
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to power, civil society continued to be repressed despite the 
government’s continued commitment to Western-oriented liberal values.  In Tunisia, unlike in 
many other countries in the region, leaders throughout the independence era (even in periods of 
authoritarian rule) publicly encouraged the growth of some forms of civil society, embracing the 
economic growth that a more freethinking society can bring.  As one of the first Arab countries 
to break with “Arab socialism” and pursue a more liberal development strategy, Tunisia created 
the space early on for a strong private sector and the cultural norms of entrepreneurship and 
individuality.81 Instead of outlawing civil society organizations entirely and losing face 
internationally, Ben Ali instituted selective liberalization and a corporatist or state-monopolized 
civil society framework.  Such frameworks can be highly appealing to authoritarian leaders who 
want to support economic development but are concerned about its pluralist effects. 82   
Civil society was unable to reach its full potential due to the wide-reaching grasp of 
authoritarianism.83   Ben Ali extensively used economic mechanisms (via the financial and 
banking sectors) as methods of repression pervasive through everyday life.84  In addition, Ben 
Ali’s rule was founded on an illusion of legitimacy.  He knew that he could not replicate the 
charismatic rule of Bourguiba; thus, obvious repression and controversially autonomous 
leadership were not sustainable options.  Ben Ali deflected international criticism for more than 
two decades by self-legitimization through discreetly fraudulent elections, relatively successful 
economic policy, preservation of many of the liberal elements of the original constitution 
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(including the Personal Status Code) and use of state-funded think-tank The Tunisian Strategic 
Studies Institute (IEST) to “engineer his own brand of democracy” and maintain an illusion of 
legitimate leadership.85  His policy of allowing Tunisian civil society to exist through restricted 
state-approved organizations, such as unions and professional associations, forced the more 
revolutionary aspects of civil society underground.  This dynamic created a civil society 
landscape of formal non-governmental institutions and informal activist networks that united to 
form the resistance against Ben Ali in 2011.  
During Ben Ali’s rule, the Tunisian public actively engaged in “formal and informal 
modes of resistance” through grassroots, social media, and youth movements.86  Activist efforts 
were also channeled through existing institutions.  The UGTT actively engaged in resistance 
efforts: in 1984, it aligned itself with the protestors during the bread revolt; in 2008, it was the 
main catalyst of the disobedience movement in the mining basin of Ghafsa; and in December 
2010, UGTT teachers’ unions and local offices were leaders in the uprising against the dictator.87   
As part of the UGTT, the Secondary School Teachers’ Union (SNES) had a long history 
of opposition to the regime.88  In April 2007, teachers – who are one of the most militant sections 
of the UGTT – went out on national strike. UGTT teachers’ union general secretary Lassad 
Yacoubi explains that in November 2007, three teachers – whose contracts were not renewed 
after the strike – went on hunger strike demanding reinstatement and inspiring international 
protests and solidarity actions.  She calls this “the first time [the unions] managed to really 
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damage the core of the regime of Ben Ali.”89  Human rights author Buthayna Bsais notes that 
prior to the 2011 uprising, “the UGTT had conducted economic education work, reaching out to 
college students, particularly low-income students,” who would later become protesters in the 
2011 uprising.90  In these ways, the UGTT’s academic elements had a direct influence on the 
growth of activism against Ben Ali in the decades leading up to the revolution, and contributed 
social capital that would support Tunisian society in the years following.  
Though activists and large organizations such as the UGTT played significant civic roles 
in the Ben Ali period, it is also important to also recognize less explicit activism carried out in 
everyday life.  As Gana (2013) notes,  
 
I am not here speaking merely about historical political opponents and opposition leaders 
such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Hamma al-Hammami, and Moncef Marzouki, among 
others, but about everyday Tunisians, journalists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers, 
intellectuals, lawyers, high school teachers, as well as school and university professors… 
[e]ven soccer players, singers, and other popular figures have at times embraced and 
passed on the tradition of dissent in the Tunisian public sphere, whether through explicit 
or encoded means and intents.91 
 
 
The beginning of serious challenges to Ben Ali’s regime came in 1998 when activists 
created the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (NCLT), an illegal human rights NGO.  The 
organization produced reports on the human rights situation in Tunisia, and in doing so inspired 
other activists to begin challenging the regime.92  One such activist was journalist Taoufik Ben 
Brik, who in 2000 carried out a hunger strike protesting his unfair treatment by the regime.  After 
this event, which received significant attention in the international media, hunger strikes became 
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a very common tool of civil resistance against Ben Ali.93  Opposition to the Ben Ali regime 
would continue through grassroots movements, union-led strikes, and protests that would finally 
reach critical mass in the Jasmine Revolution of 2011. 
 
Conclusion 
The development of civil society in Tunisia has been gradual, dynamic, and strategic.  
Under the Ottoman Empire, associations showed the potential for strong civic engagement by 
Tunisians early on.  Due to the controlling nature of the state in the colonial and post-colonial 
eras (1881-2011), NGOs representing views or objectives contrary to the interests of the 
government were not permitted.  Instead, civil society had to channel its efforts through groups 
that were either state-approved or hidden deep underground.  
The most visible example of Tunisians using a state-approved organization for civic 
functions is the labor union (UGTT).  It was “the cornerstone of the nationalist movement during 
the colonial era,” and “has always played a key pat in Tunisian politics” due to its ability to “link 
social needs with political demands by acting independently from the state apparatus.”94  Its size 
and history enabled it to challenge the regimes in ways that smaller organizations could not.  The 
UGTT – along with other unions, professional associations, and human rights and legal 
organizations – formed the structure of civil society through which the public pressed for change 
during important periods in Tunisian history (including the independence movement against the 
French and the decades of civil disobedience against Ben Ali). 
 After a long history of opposition against the French and Ben Ali, Tunisian civil society 
had the tools and experience to act with efficacy in the Tunisian revolution and transitional 
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period.  The next chapter will illuminate key ways in which the collective force of civil society 
contributed to the final overthrow of Ben Ali, advocated for change during the democratic 
transition, and served as a powerbroker in the constitution drafting process.  
 37 
CHAPTER 3: The Tunisian Revolution and Democratic Transition 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the events, institutions, and processes of the 
Tunisian revolution and democratic transition, and the involvement of civil society throughout 
both periods.95  The Tunisian people suffered for more than two decades under the corruption, 
repression, and abuse of the Ben Ali regime.  His failed economic policy, compounded by the 
2008 global financial crisis, proved crushing for millions of lower- and middle-class Tunisians.  
These grievances led to strikes and demonstrations in the years 2008 – 2010, but it was 
December 17, 2010 that proved to be the culminating point of years of strife.   
The self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi, a fruit vendor harassed by police, was a 
catalytic moment in the growing movement against the regime. Following his act, the revolution 
continued as a spontaneous civil society movement, not led by any particular ideology, party, or 
political figure.96 What began as small, localized protests by young people demanding better 
economic policy spread in a matter of days to the capital and the wealthier northern areas, where 
protestors’ demands shifted to the removal of the regime and the creation of a new democratic 
system.  Ben Ali fled on January 14, 2011, and as protests spread across North Africa and the 
Middle East, Tunisians started to pick up the pieces of their state and begin a new era of 
democratic governance.
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Civil society in the revolution 
Though youth unemployment and corruption were the initial grievances that inspired the 
uprising, civil society groups played a significant role in widening and sustaining the 
movement97 and broadening the demands to include regime change and democracy.  New 
activists built on the accumulated experience of decades of collective action in Tunisia.98 Ben 
Ali’s overconfidence in his power monopoly over the unions and NGOs, and the powerful 
alliance of creative young protesters and experienced activists, gave strength to the Tunisian 
revolution and contributed greatly to its success.  
Tunisia’s uprising was instigated by cyber activists and unemployed university graduates, 
but sustained and supported by civil society organizations – most visibly, the labor union 
(UGTT), Tunisian National Order of Lawyers (ONAT), the Tunisian Human Rights League 
(LTDH), the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), and the National Syndicate 
of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT).  These organizations supported the revolution by mobilizing 
their members across the country to grow the protest movements and consolidate the 
movement’s focus in the capital by “involving public intellectuals and middle class social and 
political activists.”99   
Groups within the UGTT, including the Primary School Teachers’ Union, the Secondary 
School Teachers’ Union (SNES), the Health Workers’ Union, and the Postal Workers’ Union 
were all early supporters of the revolution.  The SNES was even reported to have transported 
Bouazizi to the hospital for treatment following his self-immolation.100  The UGTT leadership 
initially wanted to stay out of the conflict and act as a mediator between the regime and the 
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demonstrators, but abandoned its neutral position when local and regional chapters of the UGTT 
(which had joined the protesters) convinced the national leadership to join in support.101  On 
January 11, 2011, the UGTT called for peaceful marches throughout the country, followed by a 
series of national strikes.  The labor strike of January 14, which brought hundreds of thousands 
of Tunisians into the street, was the final event that led to Ben Ali’s departure.102 
Some scholars have considered the joining of the UGTT to be the pivotal point at which 
the demands of the revolt shifted from socioeconomic grievances to regime change.103  Others 
also credit the efforts of the dissident network Takriz with shifting the aims of the uprising 
towards more political demands.104  No matter which organization was the most influential, it 
was the combined efforts of activists and more formal organizations (NGOs, unions, professional 
associations) that together articulated the political demands of the protests. 
Women were critical participants in the revolution, organizing “strikes, sit-ins, marches, 
protests, and…demonstrations” in which they played instrumental roles.105  “Women were 
empowered,” in part, “because they had for years participated in social mobilization activities by 
their unions. Activities ‘to demand improved working conditions and to defend core labor rights 
of decent work have been characterized by a massive presence of women,’” says Tunisian 
Association of Democratic Women member Saida Garrach, “lead[ing] to the important 
participation of women in the Tunisian revolution.”106   
Lawyers played the essential role of keeping the protests focused on human rights and 
civil liberties.  They organized demonstrations in front of courthouses to express their 
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dissatisfaction with the regime and advocate for political and social change.  The National Order 
of Lawyers also organized national demonstrations on December 31, 2010, to spread their 
message throughout the country.107 
Islamists did not initially play a large role in the uprising, and only joined in the last few 
days before Ben Ali’s departure.108  Ennahda, Tunisia’s largest Islamist political party, was slow 
to join the protests (like many Islamist parties in the region) in part because it had much to lose 
should the revolution fail. A history of managed pluralism and selective political openings 
strategized against the Islamists has been typical of tactics of repression in the Middle East under 
authoritarian regimes.109  Due to this, Islamists have historically suffered increased restrictions 
and limitations when advocating for greater political power, perhaps influencing their 
apprehensive reaction to the uprising. Following Ben Ali’s departure, Ennahda mobilized to gain 
political power, and civil society played a critical role in negotiating and compromising with 
Tunisia’s more religious elements once the political transition codified.  
 
Institutions of the transition 
The early transitional leadership that grew following Ben Ali’s departure was primarily 
comprised of activists, many of whom had been exiled by the former regime, and remaining civil 
servants who were not close to Ben Ali and, therefore, were not pressured to step down.  In the 
early days of the transition, the transitional leadership moved away from truly revolutionary aims 
and toward the preservation of the previous regime’s institutional apparatus.  Fearing that the 
elites would subvert the intentions of the revolution, Tunisian civil society (particularly youth 
activists) took to the streets again to force radical political reforms, and succeeded.  Their 
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pressure resulted in the final dismantling of old political institutions, changes to the composition 
of the government, and plans for an entirely new constitution written by an elected National 
Constituent Assembly (NCA).110 The transitional authorities created the High Commission for 
Political Reform (later renamed by the prime minister the Higher Authority for the Realization of 
the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and the Democratic Transition).111  This 
organization was a “group of civil society organizations, professionals, experts, and unionists 
[that served] as an interim, transitional parliament.”112 This organization was responsible for 
decision-making in the months immediately following the revolution that dictated the planned 
course of the transition.  Comparative political scientist Alfred Stepan called the Higher 
Authority “one of the most successful consensus-builders in the history of democracy.”113 
Political leadership showed restraint in politicizing the transition early on by making the 
primary goal of Tunisia’s first transitional years the creation of a new constitution instead of 
immediately holding elections to choose Tunisia’s new ruling party.  All elections prior to the 
adoption of the constitution were considered transitional: the country did not choose a new non-
transitional president until 2014.  Tunisians across the political spectrum focused on the integrity 
of the transitional process, overwhelmingly choosing negotiation and compromise over heated 
political battles. This contrasted sharply with Egypt,114 where the transition was markedly 
political from the day President Muhammad Morsi left and the constitution did not receive the 
focus it deserved.  
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After the departure of Ben Ali, civil society shouldered much of the responsibility of 
planning and instating reforms. The task of transforming Tunisia’s single party state structures 
fell to groups working inside the existing political institutions (such as the unions and opposition 
parties that existed in the Ben Ali era), and to the newly created civil society activist networks.115  
The process was instigated by a “spirit of solidarity” among the elements of civil society that had 
united against the Ben Ali regime.116  While the legislature and other transitional political 
institutions played important roles in the process of post-revolution reconstruction, it was civil 
society’s ever-evolving involvement and support that had the most significant effect on 
transitional outcomes. 
 
Civil society in the transition 
Tunisians demanded from the beginning that transitional processes be open to public 
involvement.  Focus group research indicated demands for the National Constituent Assembly to 
“listen to the people,” warning that the Assembly “should not forget what happened to Ben Ali; 
the Tunisian people revolted once and can do so again.”  According to polls, 80 percent of 
Tunisians expressed interest in voting on the constitution at referendum,117 which would only 
happen if the constitution failed to gain a two-thirds majority in the NCA. 
Public engagement in the constitution drafting project was vital to its success.  This 
occurred through CSOs as well as through more informal meetings held throughout the country. 
As noted by Jason Gluck, senior political affairs officer at the United Nations, and Michele 
Brandt, founder and director of Interpeace’s Constitution-Making for Peace Programme:   
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Inclusion, transparency, and consultation were lacking during the early stages of 
Tunisia’s constitutional review, but picked up after the NCA presented its first draft to 
the public in August 2012.  Following publication of a second draft, the NCA launched a 
two-month outreach campaign that included public meetings in the NCA representatives’ 
constituencies, hearings with interest groups, and television broadcasts of most NCA 
debates and proceedings. The United Nations Development Programme supported a 
dialogue in 2012 and 2013 between NCA members and citizens and civil society 
organizations in all twenty-four of Tunisia’s governorates; no fewer than 6,000 citizens, 
300 civil society organizations, and 320 university representatives provided input directly 
to NCA members.118 
 
 
The constitution drafting process became “the site of struggle, popular outcry, and 
national dialogue in a way that signifie[d] a restructuring of Tunisian politics and illustrate[d] the 
significance of a burgeoning civil society.”119  Throughout the three-year transitional period, 
civil society served as a voice of public opinion and a counterbalance to the power of political 
elites.  It pushed for accountability, transparency, and compromise via the media, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), unions, and informal associations.  
Tunisian civil society primarily employed two strategies to influence policymaking in the 
transitional period.  Representatives of civil society worked directly with lawmakers to 
determine the wording the constitution and negotiate between political parties when progress 
stalled.  At the same time, diverse elements of Tunisian civil society encouraged public action to 
shape the debate occurring outside of the walls of the legislature.  It is through this two-pronged 
approach that the broad array of actors that make up Tunisia’s civil society was able to influence 
the constitutional drafting process and keep the original aims of the revolution – namely 
freedom, dignity, and democracy – front and center. 
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The official inclusion of civil society in the constitution drafting process 
Helping civil society’s influence on the work of the National Constituent Assembly was 
by the fact many NCA members themselves held significant roles in civil society.  Many elected 
members of secular parties were active defenders of civil rights and leaders of civil resistance 
under the Ben Ali era, and Islamist NCA members likewise had a background of civil resistance 
against the previous regime in their fight for religious freedoms.  The makeup of the NCA, 
therefore, made it especially open to collaboration with civil society, given the representatives’ 
prior relationships with many of the organizations.  Examples of NCA members with civil 
society experience include Moncef Marzouki (one of the placeholder presidents during the 
transition), who had a long career of human rights activism against the Ben Ali regime and 
founded both the National Committee for the Defense of Prisoners of Conscience and the 
National Council for Liberties (CNLT); transitional Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, who was a 
journalist and activist prior to the revolution; and Mustapha Ben Jafar, former president of the 
NCA, who previously founded the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH). 
Civil society’s influence was formally integrated into the constitution drafting process 
through relationships between the NCA and representatives of NGOs, as well.  The NCA formed 
an Assembly Bureau in February 2012, with one of its specific functions being NCA-civil 
society relations.  The NCA appointed member Badreddine Abdelkefi to the leadership position 
of this task force.  Abdelkefi and his team established novel mechanisms for the inclusion of 
civil society in the process of drafting the constitution, including workshops, public meetings or 
“national dialogues,” and receiving constitution drafts prepared by civil society organizations.120  
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The Constituent Assembly offered representatives of civil society official spots at the table in 
drafting sessions and consulted with the public more broadly at community meetings.   
 
The external influence of civil society on the constitution drafting process 
Tunisian unions, religious groups, and media shaped the debates around the country’s 
political transition and constitution. The UGTT “emerged as the key mediator and power broker” 
during the early stages of the transition as “perhaps the only body in the country qualified to 
resolve disputes peacefully.” It directly influenced NCA decision-making: “it was within the 
union that the committee which regulated the transition to the elections of 23 October 2011 was 
formed.” The UGTT also promoted its unionist interests by “us[ing] its leverage to secure 
historic victories for its members and for workers in general, including permanent contracts for 
over 350,000 temporary workers and pay rises for several sectors, including teachers.”121   
Tunisian scholar Mohamed-Salah Omri considers the UGTT a strategic and powerful 
institution in the transition: 
 
As Tunisia moved from the period of revolutionary harmony in which UGTT played host 
and facilitator to both a political and ideological phase, characterized by the multiplicity 
of parties and the polarization of public opinion, UGTT was challenged to keep its 
engagement in politics without falling under the control of a particular party or indeed 
turning into one…Today all parties speak through UGTT and on the basis of its initiative, 
which consists in dissolving the current government, the appointment of a non-political 
government, curtailing the work of the National Constituent Assembly, reviewing top 
government appointments and dissolving the UGTT's arch enemy, the Leagues for the 
Defense of the Revolution. Union leaders are known to be experienced negotiators and 
patient and tireless activists. They have honed their skills over decades of settling 
disputes and negotiating deals. For this reason, they have been able to conduct marathon 
negotiations with the opposing parties and remain above accusations of outright bias.122 
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Religious groups were vocal in the transitional period, particularly concerning issues of 
corruption.  The social movement “Ekbes” (“Get a move on”) was formed in 2011 by a youth 
wing of Ennahda. Ekbes “put pressure on the government to launch a ‘purge campaign’ against 
those formerly aligned with the Ben Ali regime.” 123  While the group was unsuccessful in 
forcing all former regime members from government, its movement does represent civic 
activism that shaped public discourse during the transition. 
 The most conservative Islamists, known as Salafists, “advocated for sharia-inspired law 
and constitutionalism.”124 Its two main bands, “scholarly” Salafism (salafiya ilmiyya) and 
“jihadist” Salafism (salafiya jihadiyya) “publicly band[ed] together against democracy and 
ask[ed] for the implementation of sharia law without delay.”125 This movement was uncivil in 
nature and opposed to democracy, and therefore it is disputable whether Salafist activism 
constitutes true civil society activism.  Nevertheless, initiatives by Salafists formed a component 
of the landscape of movements during the political transition that deserves consideration. 
Non-religious groups formed many social and political movements in the transitional 
period.  The Open Government Initiative (OpenGovTn) is an initiative started in November 2011 
by a group of young cyber activists with the goals of increasing transparency and decreasing 
corruption in the transitional government126 and encouraging civil society to “define the 
modalities of good governance and transparency.”127  OpenGovTn’s media campaign “7ell” 
(“Open”) was an effort coordinated through the media and aimed at spreading the message of 
open government both to the public and to policy makers.  The campaign was so successful that 
the transitional president and several members of the NCA publicly supported the initiative, and 
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the National Constituent Assembly agreed to 7ell’s proposed legislation commencing public 
broadcasts of the Assembly’s meetings.128 
The media played an important external role in the transitional process by disseminating 
information from activists and civil society organizations creatively through social media, online 
magazines, radio stations, and print media.129 The sector rapidly expanded following Ben Ali’s 
departure.130 Over 220 new Tunisian print publications were created in the 2011 to 2012 
period,131 providing citizens with a variety of perspectives on the ongoing political process. The 
press focused upon debates concerning the status of women, the role of religion in society, and 
requirements for presidential candidates (including the controversy over whether former 
members of Ben Ali’s political party should be allowed to serve in government). The media 
significantly affected the outcome of Constituent Assembly deliberations by raising concerns 
about constitutional articles, deciding which issues to highlight, and mobilizing the public for or 
against certain initiatives within the Assembly.  
The NCA adopted measures to provide transparency in the process, and online news 
source Tunisia Live was allowed to stream and record NCA proceedings. However, limited 
computer use in Tunisia made it likely that a large percentage of the population did not see the 
proceedings as they occurred.132 Citizens likely received more news from newspapers, although 
the live streams heavily informed news articles. 
In the final days before the signing of the constitution, the media spearheaded a campaign 
to change certain articles of the draft constitution, namely Articles 122 and 124, which would 
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have undercut the authority of the country’s media regulator the High Independent Authority for 
Audiovisual Communication (HIAAC). This regulator was an important advocate for media 
freedom. The media criticized the government for its interference in public radio and recent 
police crackdown on journalists. The HIAAC also sponsored workshops to strengthen the media 
in Tunisia. Just ten days before ratification the head of the National Union of Tunisian 
Journalists met with the NCA and proposed amendments in support of media freedom. The 
delegates approved these amendments, which increased the regulatory authority of HIAAC.133  
 
Breaking the deadlock 
Over a three-year period, constituent assembly members wrote and debated all elements 
of the new constitution.  Little substantive progress was made, however, under Islamist party 
Ennahda’s leadership.  In the summer of 2013, progress on the constitution stagnated due to a 
majoritarian political dynamic134 in which issues raised by the opposition on key topics of 
disagreement were “almost impossible to solve in the framework of the Joint Committee for 
Cooperation and Drafting,” according Mustapha Ben Jaafar, President of the NCA.  He said the 
gridlock forced the assembly to “find a formula where everyone would feel involved and 
represented… We really wanted everyone to participate.”135 
That “formula” was the involvement of civil society.136  After months without progress, 
four powerful civil society organizations stepped up to lead a national dialogue and find 
openings for compromise within the NCA. In the summer of 2013, The UGTT labor union 
partnered with the Tunisian Association of Human Rights (LTDH), the National Order of 
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Lawyers (ONAT), and the Tunisian Union of Industry and Trade (UTICA) to form an 
organization known as the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet.  The organization “brokered 
talks between the different forces and got them to agree a roadmap that included compromises on 
the constitution, a technocratic caretaker government and an independent election 
commission.”137   
In August 2013, the Quartet presented a plan for Ennahda to step down from their 
positions of leadership.  By depoliticizing the constitution drafting process and shifting power to 
a nonpartisan technocrat government, the coalition would create an opening for negotiation over 
the main sticking points of the constitution.  The proposal won the support of the majority of 
Tunisians, who after two years of economic stagnation and growing Islamist extremism were 
ready to see Ennahda relinquish their position.  Members of the NCA negotiated the terms of the 
deal while work on the constitution continued.138   
After two months of discussions behind closed doors, Ennahda agreed to the plan.  The 
agreement provided a way for Ennahda to save face: crucially, Ennahda’s step down was 
branded not as an admittance of “defeat,” but instead a demonstration of their willingness to 
compromise for the sake of the Tunisian people.  The UGTT hosted a press event for the signing 
of the Road Map, as it had come to be called, in October 2013.  Upon arriving at the event, and 
discovering that they would be signing the document in front of dozens of TV cameras and 
reporters, many politicians balked.  It allegedly took multiple hours of off-stage convincing 
between the UGTT leadership and Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi to persuade the party to 
go through with the deal.  Forcing all of the political parties to sign the agreement publicly was 
critical to making each of the signatories accountable to the document.  
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The Quartet proved to be the single most influential factor in the success of the Tunisian 
constitution drafting process.  The unions and professional associations were able to serve as 
strong power brokers in negotiations between political parties thanks to their long history in the 
Tunisian public sphere, non-partisan nature, and authority gained over decades as representatives 
of the public and private sectors against the state. Because they do not belong to one political or 
religious orientation, the unions are seen as the representatives of “the people.”  It is through this 
reputation, forged through decades of resistance against the state, that the UGTT was able to 
have such a productive influence the NCA and convince parties to make real compromises. 
 
Conclusion 
The National Constituent Assembly put forth drafts of the constitution on August 13, 
2012, December 12, 2012, and April 30, 2013.139  The NCA adopted the final constitution on 
January 27, 2014 – just four months after Ennahda gave up power.  Over 90 percent of the 
assembly (200 members) voted for it, with 12 voting against and four abstaining.140  This was 
well over the two-thirds majority needed, meaning it did not go to public referendum as opinion 
polls indicated the vast majority of Tunisians initially desired.  However, public discontent was 
mitigated by the assembly’s “deliberate and organized efforts to reach out to and consult with 
people during the negotiation,” which had amassed widespread support for the constitution and 
given it a sense of legitimacy despite not having gone to public referendum.141 
Civil society benefitted greatly from new articles concerning laws of association, which 
created novel legal provisions for association networks in Tunisia.  These include Article 26, 
which states that two or more associations may establish an associations network; Article 29, 
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which allows networks to acquire legal personality independent from the personality of its 
member associations; and Article 30, which stipulates that networks may accept branches of 
foreign associations in its membership.142  These laws not only provide freedoms of association 
and assembly to groups, but to citizens as well.  The political activities allowed under Decree 88 
are broad ranging and match international norms and principles. 143  
Civil society had a significant effect upon the transition by publicly supporting the 
inclusion of rights and liberties in the constitution, challenging the coalition government, and 
advocating for legislative changes.144  According to Gluck and Brandt, “[p]ublic reaction to the 
first draft contributed to at least three substantive changes, while lobbying from civil society 
groups helped secure guarantees regarding separation of powers and rights and freedoms.”145  
While politicians argued amongst themselves, plagued by rivalries and historical grievances, 
elements of civil society were able to step in and promote the interests of the public in a 
nonpartisan way.  The actions of the unions, activists, media, and NGOs, among others, ensured 
that the public had a voice in the constitution drafting process.  The accomplishments of the 
Quartet were recognized in October 2015 when it received the Nobel Peace Prize for “its 
decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the 
Jasmine Revolution of 2011.”146 
 The steady development of civil society throughout the course of Tunisian history gave it 
the authority, experience, and reputation to act.  It did so by demanding accountability from 
lawmakers, lobbying for changes in the constitution, and acting, when needed, as a mediator 
between political parties.   The presence of civil society presence during Tunisia’s constitution 
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drafting process contributed a valuable focus on human rights and civil liberties found in no 
other constitution in the Middle East.  
  Given the diversity of Tunisian civil society and the depth of its involvement in the 
transitional period, its efforts and effects are perhaps best observed through the targeted analysis 
of one issue in which civil society was involved.  Women’s rights – specifically, the legal status 
of women in the constitution – was one of the most intensely contested issues during the 
transition. Tracing the evolution of the debate concerning women’s constitutional rights, and 
identifying key moments of key civil society involvement, finds that Tunisian civil society was a 
proactive force in the constitution drafting process by voicing the concerns of the public, 
negotiating with policymakers, and significantly altering the outcome of political decision-
making in the democratic transition. 
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CHAPTER 4: Case Study – Civil Society in the Debate Over Women’s Constitutional Rights 
 
During the four-year constitution drafting process, public interest in the constitution 
spiked following controversial events, such as the September 14, 2012 attack on the U.S. 
Embassy, the assassinations of opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, and the 
proposal of divisive articles.  These “flash points” represent moments when the constitutional 
debate extended far beyond the walls of the legislature and into the public sphere.  The articles 
on women’s rights and Islam were by far the most controversial of any in proposed drafts in the 
constitution.147  The polarizing political climate between Islamists and secularists played out in 
the battle over women’s rights in the constitution and made women’s rights a central and hotly 
debated issue.148  It inspired the activism of multiple sectors of civil society, which together 
convinced the Islamist-led government to recognize women’s equality.  This particular debate 
offers an opportunity to identify and assess the roles various civil society organizations and 
actors played in the constitution drafting process. 
On August 13, 2012, the constitutional assembly released the first draft of the 
constitution, several articles of which came under public scrutiny. Article 28, proposed by the 
Commission of Rights and Freedoms, was particularly contentious:  
 
The state shall guarantee the protection of the rights of women and shall support the gains 
thereof as true partners to men in the building of the nation and as having a role 
complementary thereto within the family.  The state shall guarantee the provision of 
equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of various responsibilities.  
The state shall guarantee the elimination of all forms of violence against women.149 
                                                
147 Maaike Voorhoeve, “Women’s rights in the new Tunisian constitution.” 
148 Alcinda Honwana, Youth and Revolution in Tunisia, 166-167. 
149 Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, 2012. 
 54 
The commission approved the article by a 12-8 vote; nine of those in favor belonged to 
Ennahda.150  Much of the dissatisfaction with the article, widely expressed by non-Ennahda 
members of the constituent assembly and the public, resulted from the term “complementary” 
(yetekaamul).  Many called it a contradiction to the other parts of the draft constitution that 
emphasized unequivocal gender equality.151   
The public outrage over Article 28 signified a shift from “politics from above” to 
“politics from below,” as the text of the constitution entered public discourse and received 
attention across all sectors of society. 152  Discussion of the article “flourished across political 
parties and civic organizations and groups.”153  The debate over women’s rights in the 
constitution was a catalyst for the widespread and passionate involvement of civil society across 
multiple sectors, making it a prime example of the interaction of civil society and the political 
process in Tunisia. 
 
Activists 
Immediately following the revolution, activists in Tunisia expressed concerns for the 
rights of women, fearing “the threat of a loss in the gains made since the passage of the [Personal 
Status Code] in 1956 and the reforms related to women’s rights in the areas of marriage, divorce, 
and child custody it inaugurated.”154  On August 13, 2011, nearly two months before Ennahda 
came into power, more than a thousand women marched in Tunis to commemorate the 55th 
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anniversary of the passage of the 1956 Personal Status Code and express their support for 
women’s rights in the post-revolution period.155   
Women planned to celebrate the anniversary again on October 13, 2012, but the event 
suddenly became an opportunity for protest upon the release of the draft constitution that same 
day.  In response to Article 28, they “changed the celebrations into protests and organized a rally, 
which included at least 20,000 to 30,000 demonstrators.156  They also waged a media campaign 
and circulated petitions against the proposed language. The demonstrations brought the issue to 
international attention, as it started to be discussed in international media and forums such as the 
United Nations Human Rights Council.157  The protests united women across Tunisian society, 
as Mounira M. Charrad and Amina Zarrugh of the University of Texas at Austin describe: 
 
Women in attendance were either unaffiliated with any organisation or identified with 
organisations such as the Democratic Women’s Association, La Ligue Tunisienne des 
Droits de l’Homme (LTDH), and Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la 
Recherche sur le Développement (AFTURD). Women held signs including slogans such 
as ‘Rise up women for your rights to be enshrined in the constitution’ and ‘there is no 
Tunisian future without women,’ which demanded unambiguous rights for women. 
Women, young and old as well as rural and urban, attended the large-scale protest and 
held signs that featured French and Arabic. In addition to critiques around the term 
‘complementary’ were concerns about the specificity of complementarity within the 
family. For some activists, the clause not only defined women’s rights vis-à-vis men but 
also only as married women, which represented another affront to women’s interests.158 
 
 
Students, too, were heavily involved with the debate over women’s rights. College 
students facilitated discussions around the proposed “complementary” article, and women’s 
presence in the discussions “highlighted their key role.”159  Universities, which often served as 
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locations for the public meetings held by the NCA, became a breeding ground for activism and 
protest against government policy, such as the proposal of Article 28. 
Conservatives, too, joined the debate over the article.   Islamist women, particularly 
Ennahda members in the NCA, voiced their support for the article.  Some of these women argued 
that opposition parties misinterpreted the language of the article.  Among the staunchest 
defenders of the article, Ennhada Executive Council member Farida Labidi declared that “[o]ne 
cannot speak of equality between man and woman in the absolute.”  The diversity of positions 
advocated by supporters and opponents of Article 28, and the nuanced conversations that ensued 
about the specific meanings of terms like “complementary” and “equality,” illustrate the deep 
internalization of the debate over women’s rights by the public in the post-revolution era: a 
significant departure from the top-down gender policy that prevailed in earlier periods.160 
 
Non-governmental organizations 
Non-governmental organizations were central to ensuring women’s equality in post-
revolution Tunisia.  Even before the proposal of Article 28, they moved to increase women’s 
voice through their numbers in the National Constituent Assembly. The Association of Tunisian 
Democratic Women (ATFD), in particular, exerted its considerable influence to demand 
electoral parity.161  This rule, passed by the higher authority in April 2011,162 required that 
candidate lists for the 2011 National Constituent Assembly had to alternate between men and 
women, making half of the candidates of any given party female and half of them male (Decree 
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35, Article 16).163  Because some political parties won an odd number of seats and chose to 
appoint more male representatives, women gained only 27 percent.  Nevertheless, the 
Assembly’s makeup of 27 percent women (significantly higher than the world average of 19 
percent) was enough for women to have a significant voice within the NCA.  In this way, 
women’s organizations such as the AFTD had an early influence on the protection of women’s 
rights in the constitution. 
Women’s organizations played the crucial role of uniting women across ideological lines.  
While women on either side of the ideological spectrum disagreed fundamentally on the role of 
women in society, women’s organizations tried to reframe the debate away from a perceived 
Islamist/secularist battle and towards issues that could unite the majority of Tunisian women.164  
Women’s organizations were also active in shaping perceptions of Ennahda.  Ennahda 
experienced a number of controversies during its time in power, many related to women’s rights. 
Women’s groups claimed that Ennahda “behind its modern rhetoric is concealing a reactionary 
project, the implementation of which it has postponed to a more appropriate moment.”165  
Prominent Ennahda member Souad Abderrahim, in a radio interview, called single mothers “a 
disgrace to Tunisia,” stating that they do not have the right to exist, they should have limits on 
their freedom, and that one should not make excuses for those who have sinned.  The interview 
provoked impassioned responses from Tunisian women’s groups, which contributed to the 
perception that Ennahda was anti-woman and hypocritical166 – a reputation that contributed to 
their ousting in the summer of 2013. 
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 Other non-governmental organizations allied with women’s organizations to fight for 
women’s equality.  The Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the Tunisian National 
Order of Lawyers (ONAT), the two non-union members of the National Dialogue Quartet, 
organized demonstrations for women’s rights and participated in direct negotiations with 
legislative representatives.  This alliance strengthened their collective ability to fight for 
women’s rights in the constitution, particularly due to these two NGOs' status as members of the 
powerful and influential Quartet.  
 
Unions  
 The UGTT labor union, as part of the National Dialogue Quartet, was well situated to 
negotiate changes to Article 28.  It used its status to push for women’s equality both in formal 
negotiations with the NCA and through public protests.  The UGTT was one of the leading 
organizations of the August 13 rally against Article 28.  Organizers within the UGTT called on 
women and men alike, arguing that “this issue affects everyone.” 167  On International Women’s 
Day, March 8, 2013, the UGTT formally “urged the government… to activate the UN’s 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women” and eliminate the 
“complementary clause” of Article 28.168 
The UGTT’s pre-revolution efforts also paved the way for liberal social movements in 
the transitional period that supported women’s rights.  The organization’s economic education 
work contributed to youth community involvement that was visible in the transition and 
specifically in debates concerning the status of women.  Notes Tunisian human rights author 
Buthayna Bsais: 
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Prior to the uprising, the UGTT had conducted economic education work, reaching out to 
college students, particularly low-income students. These students later joined in the 
constitutional debates that followed. College students facilitated discussions around the 
proposed “complementary” article, and women’s presence in the discussions highlighted 
their key role.169 
 
 
Additionally, skills and experience gained by female UGTT members helped them to act 
as leaders in the transition. By “offer[ing] a supportive space for women to connect, develop 
skills, and pool resources,” the UGTT “ensured the success of the democratic transition.” 170  The 
unions fostered the creation of networks and associations that became essential in the 
mobilization for causes such as the fight against Article 28.171  
 
A successful outcome 
Following the strong domestic and international reaction to the content of the proposed 
article, the “complementary” clause of Article 28 was omitted, as were specific references to 
sharia law as the official and primary source of legislation in the country.172  The article on 
women’s rights in the final version of the constitution is as follows: 
 
Article 46: Women’s rights 
The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and work to strengthen and develop 
those rights. 
The state guarantees the equality of opportunities between women and men to have access to 
all levels of responsibility in all domains. 
The state works to attain parity between women and men in elected Assemblies. 
The state shall take all necessary measures in order to eradicate violence against women.173 
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Women’s rights are also enshrined in the Preamble and Article 21, which state the 
equality of rights and duties between all citizens, male and female; Article 34, which guarantees 
women’s representation in elected bodies; Article 40, which states that every citizen, male and 
female, has the right to work, decent working conditions, and a fair wage; and Article 74, which 
gives men and women the right to stand for election to the position of President of the 
Republic.174 
 
Conclusion 
Tunisian women marched alongside men in 2011 with hopes of freedom, dignity, and 
democracy.  However, they did not do so in the pursuit of a distinct feminist agenda.175  
Women’s rights were not central to the demands of the 2011 protests, nor were they initially a 
priority for the lawmakers elected to write the constitution.  The constitution drafting period 
“marked a turning point for the role of women in the public space, as [it] opened unprecedented 
opportunities for women to be directly involved in the promotion of their rights.”176  
Even though Tunisian women have enjoyed freedom for more than half a century, it did 
not arise from a natural feminist movement. Tunisia’s progressive stance on women’s rights, 
codified in the personal status code, arose from a “top-down, state-centered modernization 
project” pushed by the Bourguiba regime in part to fight the Islamization of society.177  Since 
2011, feminism in Tunisia has grown significantly,178 with women engaging in public debates 
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and fighting for their own rights.179  Their level of participation in the transition and efficacy in 
changing the wording of the constitution “attests to the strength of women’s engagement in civil 
society”180 while also showing that “the new ruling forces in Tunisia are receptive to pressure 
from the national and international women’s movements and from international institutions.”181 
Despite gaining legal parity, women in Tunisia still have work to do to gain full social 
and economic equality.  As explained by Tula Connell:  
 
Some women are more optimistic than others about the future of civil society in the new 
Tunisia. However they view the future, though, they intend to play a significant role in 
shaping it. Women in the nation’s capital, Tunis, are reaching out to women in 
impoverished rural communities, providing food and health services while engaging them 
in education about their rights as citizens. The UGTT National Committee of Women 
Workers is partnering with other allied groups to create a new organization to combat 
violence against women, which has dramatically increased in the wake of the uprising. 
Says Aida Al-Zawee, a UGTT board member, ‘Through supporting the legislation of the 
union, supporting women’s committees, through conducting many meetings— meetings 
through which we can cooperate to a great extent with other women’s organizations—this 
is the solution.’182 
 
The success of Tunisians uniting across ideological and social lines to push for women’s 
equality, despite the efforts of the governing party to give women complementary status, speaks 
to the strength of civil society in the Tunisian democratic transition.  The movement exemplifies 
the coalescence of multiple elements of civil society – unions, NGOs, the media, activists, 
students, religious groups, professional associations – to debate this issue and determine 
Tunisia’s future.  The ability of these groups to strategically advocate for change, and the ways 
in which the transitional government responded to them, serve as key lessons on the potential for 
positive collaboration between civil society and the official leadership during political 
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transitions.  The next chapter will propose five central lessons gained from Tunisia’s experience 
that may be used to strengthen processes in other countries undergoing transitions. 
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CHAPTER 5: Lessons from Tunisia on the Role of Civil Society in Democratization  
 
The success of Tunisian civil society’s efforts in the democratic transition offers lessons 
for other countries undergoing political change.  Whether in the beginning stages of opposition 
against a dictator or in the process of drafting a new constitution, societies (and those supporting 
them) must consider the strength of civil society and the nature of its relationship to the state.  
Tunisia’s experience offers insights regarding the ability of civil society to broker negotiations, 
encourage compromise, and keep the democratic transition on track by balancing the power of 
transitional political institutions.  Moreover, it shows that civil society involvement does not just 
have to come from NGOs and revolutionaries, but can also come from more formal institutions 
(such as unions and trade associations) that have encouraged civic education among the public in 
more discreet ways. 
 In cases of democratic transition, international organizations, foreign governments, 
transitional leaders, and native populations would all benefit from an increased recognition of the 
importance of civil society.  The events of Tunisia’s transitional period illustrate the ways in 
which government and civil society can collaborate in a post-conflict situation to develop a legal 
framework in an inclusive, participatory process.  Tunisia’s example can offer insights on the 
need for a shift in thinking regarding what civil society is, how it is identified, how necessary it 
is to political transitions, the multitude of ways in which it can engage with the transitional 
process, and the ways it can benefit all actors in a political transition. Given the difficulty many 
countries have faced in developing and maintaining new systems of government – not just in the 
Arab world, but worldwide – it is all the more impressive that Tunisia developed a constitution 
passed by more than 90 percent of the legislature.  Taking into account the historical context 
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provided in previous sections, this chapter will identify ways in which lessons from Tunisia’s 
transition may be applied elsewhere to produce positive and progressive change. 
 
Policy Recommendation #1: Prioritize inclusivity of non-governmental stakeholders 
Despite the relatively small number of what would typically be identified as “civil society 
organizations” in the pre-colonial, colonial, Bourguiba, or Ben Ali periods, Tunisia was not 
lacking in the foundations of civil society.  Instead, civil society took on more discreet forms 
(both through civic culture and informal networks, as well as government-approved unions and 
associations).  In Egypt, associations were prolific even under Mubarak, but these organizations 
were not civic in orientation.  Scholars in the pre-Arab Spring period, looking only at 
associations per capita, incorrectly concluded that Egypt had a stronger civil society than 
Tunisia.  In reality, the single most powerful element of civil society in the drafting process (the 
UGTT) had existed prior to the revolution, and is representative of the sort of atypical civil 
society organizations that had a positive influence on the drafting process.  While adopting a 
more flexible understanding of civil society requires deeper case-specific analysis, the rewards 
are significant.  Conceptualizing civil society in more nuanced terms than just associations per 
capita offers the opportunity for better understanding and interpretation of civil society and its 
roots in developing countries, increasing the chances of more accurate approaches in future 
transitions.  Beneficial metrics would include the passion people have for principles of civic 
activism, the level of public participation in civil society organizations, and the history of 
community organizing and consensus-building regarding community issues.   
One of the most important and commendable decisions made by the Tunisian National 
Constituent Assembly was the nomination of a member in charge of relations with civil society.  
 65 
This member officially integrated civil society in the constitution drafting process through 
initiatives designed to include many different strata of civil society, representing a plethora of 
different concerns and visions.  Doing so not only provided fresh ideas for the constitutional 
design, but also deepened citizens’ sense of inclusion in the drafting process.  This heightened 
feeling of inclusion may give citizens a greater attachment to and respect for the laws created, 
which has the power to increase lawfulness and decrease corruption in the future. According to 
Gluck and Brandt, “[t]he more inclusive, transparent, and participatory process employed [in 
Tunisia] seems to have helped the country eventually reach a greater consensus that conferred 
some degree of legitimacy to the constitution and, by extension, Tunisia’s democratic 
transition.”183  In a broader way, the participative constitution drafting process benefitted the 
society a method of post-conflict peace building.  They note: 
 
Inclusiveness and participation seems to have taught Tunisians a new paradigm of 
political discourse and conflict resolution. “Tunisians didn’t know how to communicate 
before,” remarks Abdullah Fadhli, of an association of unemployed people. “We were so 
used to being afraid to say anything of substance outside of our own homes, in case there 
was an RCD spy nearby. Now we are learning to talk together again.” The benefits of 
inclusion and participation have been felt in other ways as well. According to one 
member of the NCA, “Before the Revolution, there was no clear role for Civil Society in 
decision-making and no conception of how people should participate in public debates.” 
Inclusion “brought people closer together. People have learned to listen to each other…a 
culture of dialogue [is] emerging.” There are already plans for the next parliament to set 
up mechanisms for further strengthening relations with civil society.184 
 
Policy Recommendation #2: Draft and implement the constitution before holding elections 
 Tunisia’s decision to focus the initial transitional period on the drafting of a new 
constitution, and not elect official leaders until after that job was completed, helped to focus the 
efforts of the transition and reduce the amount of political posturing and competition that 
occurred.  In contrast, Egypt (the only other country to undergo an attempted democratic 
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transition after the 2011 uprisings) held elections very early and did not give as much regard to 
the constitution.  Tunisia’s mostly nonviolent democratic transition, compared with Egypt’s 
violent power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army, can be at least partially 
credited to the focus on consensus building around the constitution rather than political battles. 
  
Policy Recommendation #3: Democratization processes should be internally led and externally 
supported 
Civil society also filled many roles in the constitutional process not officially sanctioned 
by the NCA.  Actions taken by civil society – channeled through activists, unions, and NGOs, in 
particular – served to preserve national unity and solidarity despite lengthy periods without 
progress on the constitution. The media played a critical role by transmitting the ongoing debates 
to the public, letting them in on the decisions being made, and in doing so, increasing their sense 
of inclusion. 
The leadership roles taken on by civil society kept the transition on track by providing 
leadership when elected officials were unable to do so themselves and acting as a mediator 
between parties when conflicts became unproductive.  The Quartet’s coordination of Ennahda’s 
voluntary step-down from power was a pivotal moment in the transition without which the 
constitution drafting process would have been severely compromised.  The unsolicited 
involvement of unions, professional associations, and other civil society organizations as 
interparty mediators is demonstrative of the breadth of crucial functions civil society can fulfill 
in a transitional process if given the opening to do so.   
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Policy Recommendation #4: Strengthen political linkages between government and civil society 
 The way in which the Tunisian transitional leadership designed the country’s new 
political system had great implications for the future of civil society involvement in the future.  
By creating a strong, responsive parliamentary system, Tunisians implemented a system more 
likely to sustain new norms of civil engagement.  As explained by conflict analyst Shelley 
Deane: 
The structure of the political system shapes the way CSOs act. A strong parliamentary 
system tends to have fewer barriers to entry for CSOs, with fewer restrictions and 
regulations on CSOs’ activities and funding sources. While governments have incentives 
to regulate CSOs – particularly exclusive ones such as the Salafists that exclude rather 
than include others – parliamentary systems are more likely to provide an open 
environment for CSO access to government. In a strong parliamentary system of 
government, CSOs are more likely to be viewed as agents who can inform government 
by articulating the preferences of civil society.185 As a result, parliamentary systems 
provide far greater access points for civil society activism. Tunisia’s parliamentary 
system is best placed to sustain the spirit of collaboration established by civil society 
associations during the revolution.186 
  
The decision to create a system in which much of the power rests in a strong, flexible 
parliament has a positive effect on the chances of a continued collaborative government-civil 
society relationship in the future.  Such a strategy may be implemented in other transitional 
societies to likewise increase the odds of positive and productive government-civil society 
relations. 
 
Policy Recommendation #5: Increase political participation among nontraditional actors 
Civil society serves as a valuable vehicle for civic engagement for those who may 
otherwise not choose to involve themselves in politics.  While Tunisian youth are still widely 
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disconnected from and disinterested in the formal political process, they are not apolitical or 
apathetic.  They consciously reject the political party system, and instead choose to engage in 
civil society organizations and protests to fight for social and political change.187 Though they 
largely refuse to enter traditional political structures, such as parties, young Tunisians participate 
actively in social movements and civil society initiatives to express their political demands and 
contribute to the building of a democratic state.188 
 
Conclusion 
 Tunisia’s successful democratic transition was the result of hard work and collaborative 
efforts made by political leaders, civil society actors, and the public as a whole.  This dedication 
led to the creation of a nearly universally supported constitution that managed to overcome the 
Islamist/secularist divide that so deeply entrenches conflicts throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa. Tunisia’s inclusive constitution drafting processes, civil society-government 
relations, collaborative planning, and involvement of nontraditional actors serve as valuable 
examples for strategies used to further democratic transitions in post-conflict societies. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Tunisian civil society’s involvement in the drafting of the constitution provides a case 
study on the avenues through which communities can initiate public-backed legal reforms during 
political transitions.  The struggles and successes of Tunisia’s civil society illuminate a number 
of findings that challenge conventional thought about Tunisia, the Arab world, and political 
transitions as a whole. 
Contrary to many scholars’ observations and predictions prior to 2011, Tunisia had a 
strong, pre-existing civil society capable of strategically and forcefully demanding change.  The 
speed and depth to which Tunisian civil society took up the responsibility of lobbying, 
negotiating, and otherwise promoting human rights, civic values, and public interests in the post-
revolution political realm demonstrates that civil society prior to the revolution not only existed, 
but thrived.  This misjudgment on the part of scholars may be attributed in part to a narrow 
understanding of civil society that values associations per capita over the broader appreciation of 
civic values.  
It also challenges the notion that the success of Tunisia’s transition can be primarily 
attributed to Tunisian politicians’ civility and willingness to compromise.  With so little progress 
made on the constitution until Ennahda’s departure in 2013, much credit should be given to the 
unions and professional associations involved in orchestrating the shift in leadership and 
implementation of the new political road map that led to a constitution in less than four months.  
The roles of the UGTT and others as mediators and powerbrokers represent an important lesson 
on the resources gained from involving nontraditional parties in the constitution drafting process. 
On a broader level, the ability of Tunisian civil society to push for change and contribute 
to the constitution drafting process defies the assumption that Arab or Islamic societies are 
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unable to democratize.  Despite societal divisions entrenched over years of colonialism, 
dictatorship, and religious/secularist animosity, Tunisians were able to produce a widely-
supported constitution in a relatively short time frame due to the collaborative nature of the 
drafting process.  Tunisia’s example must be taken into account when considering other 
democracy-supporting initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.  This case study 
illuminates the need for multi-level, integrative approaches to consensus building in any political 
transition or significant legislative project.  Taking such steps can greatly improve the quality 
and inclusiveness of legislation, providing a stronger foundation for society moving forward. 
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